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—  Note  — 
Walking a Tightrope:  
Regulating Medicare Fraud and 
Abuse and the Transition to 
Value-Based Payment  
“The current legal environment has created major barriers to 
delivery system innovation. Innovation will not occur if each 
novel way to organize and pay for care needs to be adjudicated 
case-by-case or is threatened with legal proceedings.”1 
Abstract 
As the American health care system undergoes a fundamental 
shift from paying for health care on a fee-for-service basis to one 
based on value, providers are faced with the question of how to 
structure the business arrangements necessary to operate in a value-
based market while simultaneously complying with the existing fraud-
and-abuse regulatory framework. The passage of health care reform 
ushered in an era of rapid change in how health care is delivered, but 
the underlying regulatory structure within which health care business 
arrangements must reside has not kept pace with these changes. 
Consequently, providers are left to question whether their business 
arrangements comply with prior laws and regulations. While the 
government has recognized the inherent disconnect between the value-
based care framework and the regulatory regime predicated on fee-for-
service financial incentives, policy makers have not offered a 
permanent solution.  
This Note addresses the fundamental conflict between paying for 
the value of care where providers assume risk for the management of 
a population’s health in more tightly integrated care settings and the 
application of a fraud-and-abuse framework that came about because 
of perverse incentives in fee-for-service reimbursement. The discussion 
includes a review of the waiver authority granted by Congress as part 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which has 
facilitated certain innovative, value-based pilots, and evaluates the 
scope and long-term viability of this approach. While the waivers 
have, to a certain extent, permitted the development of the business 
relationships required to assume risk and receive value-based 
payments, they have left unanswered many questions that continue to 
cause providers to act cautiously. The resulting hesitation by  
1.  Timothy S. Jost & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Legal Reforms Necessary to 
Promote Delivery System Innovation, 299 JAMA 2561, 2561 (2008).  
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providers to implement value-based reforms has chilled the pace of 
innovation. This Note argues for a new approach to regulating health 
care fraud and abuse in an era of expanded value-based payment and 
highly integrated provider relationships. This approach considers the 
role of the fee-for-service regulatory framework in light of new 
incentives to deliver high quality, value-based care and builds on the 
steps already taken to ensure integrity within the Medicare Shared 
Savings Program.  
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Introduction 
The portion of the United States economy devoted to paying for 
health care has more than doubled over the last forty years.2 Efforts 
to curtail the rate of growth and reduce spending have a long history 
and have achieved varying degrees of success. The onset of large 
governmental payers like Medicare3 and Medicaid4 in 1965 and the 
corresponding increase in health care expenditures focused the 
attention of policymakers who sought to preserve the financial 
integrity of the programs.  
Perhaps as a function of reimbursing providers on a fee-for-service 
basis, the problem of providers paying kickbacks in exchange for 
referrals became a significant threat to the financial health of the 
federal programs.5 In 1972, Congress realized the detrimental effect 
these improper payment arrangements could have on the solvency of 
the programs and made it a crime to knowingly offer or receive 
“remuneration” in exchange for the referral of health services financed 
by the Medicare and Medicaid programs.6 The anti-kickback statute 
and its associated safe harbors have since become one of the hallmark 
structural regulations aimed at mitigating fraud and abuse in the 
federal health care programs.  
Throughout the 1980s, the effort to contain costs through 
managed care utilization controls, coupled with Medicare’s 
prospective payment system,7 created incentives for physicians to 
engage in entrepreneurial business practices that could take advantage 
of a reimbursement system based on payment for each separate 
service provided.8 These arrangements included the provision of in-
 
2. See Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Health Care Costs: A 
Primer 4 (2012), http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7670-03.pdf 
(noting that the share of the United States economy “devoted to health 
care grew from 7.2% in 1970 to 17.9% in 2010”).  
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395–1395hhh (2006). 
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396v (2006). 
5. See Richard P. Kusserow, The Medicare & Medicaid Anti-Kickback 
Statute and the Safe Harbor Regulations—What’s Next?, 2 Health 
Matrix 49, 69 (1992) (“Congress passed the anti-kickback statute 
because of its justifiably serious concern over the consequences that 
payment for referrals has on the Federal health programs . . . .”).  
6. Id. at 49–53. The statute is commonly referred to as the anti-kickback 
statute and is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006). 
7. See discussion infra Part I.A.  
8. See Patrick A. Sutton, The Stark Law in Retrospect, 20 Annals 
Health L. 15, 16–17 (2011) (describing various practice arrangements 
that physicians began to develop in response to cost containment, 
partially attributable to the Medicare prospective payment system); 
David Mechanic, The Rise and Fall of Managed Care, 45 J. Health & 
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office ancillary and laboratory services, physician ownership of 
diagnostic imaging centers and durable medical equipment companies, 
and physician investment in outpatient surgery centers. Physicians 
were able to supplement the reduction in income that they 
experienced as a result of managed care by referring patients for 
treatment at a facility in which they had a financial interest.9  
Seeking to curtail this practice, Representative Fortney “Pete” 
Stark sponsored legislation that would bar Medicare and Medicaid 
patient referrals by any physician to a facility providing designated 
health services in which the physician or a member of her family had 
an investment interest or a compensation arrangement.10 The statute, 
by its very nature, presumed that all existing referrals made to 
entities with physician ownership interests or compensation 
arrangements were illegal unless the parties to such arrangements 
could satisfy one of the enumerated exceptions in the statute or those 
later promulgated by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid  
Services (CMS).11 
Together, the anti-kickback statute and the Stark law, along with 
provisions of the False Claims Act12 and the Civil Monetary Penalties 
(CMP) provision of the Social Security Act,13 formed the basis from 
which the federal government regulated the structural relationships 
within the health care sector. It is against this background that 
innovations in provider reimbursement gained traction in the early 
2000s, as health policy experts began to question the effectiveness of 
paying providers for the volume of services provided with little 
consideration of the value or quality of care delivered.14 As 
experiments for value-based payment began to show signs of success, 
so too did they begin to highlight the restrictive nature of the 
underlying fraud-and-abuse regulatory scheme. In many instances, 
 
Soc. Behav. 76, 81 (2004) (“As employee complaints increased and the 
public expressed dissatisfaction with restrictions on choice, both 
employers and health plans retreated by relaxing the utilization controls 
that gave managed care advantages in constraining costs . . . . [P]rivate 
plans and provider groups showed ingenuity in devising new types of 
practice arrangements that adapted to changing circumstances.”).  
9. Sutton, supra note 8, at 16–17.  
10. Id. at 24–25.  
11. Id. at 25. At the time, CMS was referred to as the Health Care 
Financing Administration, or HCFA.  
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (2006). The Civil False Claims Act allows the 
government to recover civil penalties from individuals and permits 
“quitam” actions brought by individuals on behalf of the government. 
See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2006).  
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (2006). 
14. See discussion infra Part II.B.  
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these regulations either prohibited, or made very risky, a number of 
integrated provider relationships that were required to form successful 
value-based payment arrangements.  
In 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)15 
formally blessed several of the value-based payment initiatives that 
showed early success in pilot arrangements and encouraged broader 
adoption by providers. The regulatory framework within which these 
legally enshrined initiatives are to operate, however, has not changed. 
Perhaps realizing the difficulty in structuring the provider 
arrangements necessary for receiving value-based payments, Congress 
granted waiver authority to the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, which provides for the waiver of various fraud-and-abuse 
laws and regulations—namely the anti-kickback statute, Stark, and 
several CMP provisions—for entities participating in various payment 
programs.16  
This Note highlights the incongruity between the existing health 
care regulatory framework and modern forms of value-based 
payments. It argues that the fraud-and-abuse waivers are unduly 
narrow and do not provide sufficient guidance to providers who may 
at some point become technically noncompliant with a specific 
requirement of the value-based payment program. This Note goes on 
to explore ways in which legislators and policy makers can implement 
changes into the waiver program to facilitate the broader transition to 
value-based payments in the short term. The long-term challenge, 
however, involves making a more permanent transition from the 
structural approach to regulating fraud and abuse to an approach 
that obviates the need for blanket waivers. This approach would build 
on the quality reporting, transparency, and accountability 
requirements that CMS uses to protect against program abuse in the 
Medicare Shared Savings Program. The lingering issue for legislators 
is defining the future role of the underlying statutes from which a 
growing number of providers are receiving waivers to structure their 
business arrangements.  
Part I provides an historical overview of the Medicare fee-for-
service reimbursement system and the fraud-and-abuse provisions 
enacted in that era to combat the effects of essentially paying for the 
volume of services provided. Part II explains recent developments in 
the move to pay providers according to the value of care, including 
early value-based payment demonstration projects that were 
expanded in the ACA.  
 
15. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  
16. See id. § 1899(f) (granting the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
the authority to waive fraud-and-abuse provisions to carry out 
demonstration projects under the ACA).  
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Part III elaborates on the disconnect between the current 
structural regulations concerning relationships among health care 
providers and the provisions of the ACA that encourage innovative 
payment-for-value models. Part IV then discusses the implications of 
this disconnect and critiques aspects of the regulatory waivers that 
have left many questions unanswered. Finally, Part V offers short-
term proposals regarding the use of fraud-and-abuse waivers and 
contemplates the long-term application and viability of the structural 
regulations whose provisions are waived under the value-based 
payment approach.  
I. Medicare Reimbursement and Structural 
Regulation in the Pre-Reform Era 
Before passage of the ACA in March 2010, the Medicare program 
had engaged in a handful of payment experiments but never 
implemented them on a larger scale.17 Up to that point, Medicare paid 
physicians and hospitals primarily on the volume of care they 
provided, with little or no emphasis on the quality or value of that 
care. Though the movement to pay providers based on the value of 
care had its followers,18 the unrestrained growth of Medicare 
expenditures without a corresponding increase in quality outcomes19 
prompted an unambiguous embrace of the principles of value-based 
payment in the formulation of the ACA.20 In order to better 
understand the movement toward paying for value, it is important to 
first understand the structure of Medicare fee-for-service payment and 
some of its inherent effects. 
A. Structure of Medicare Fee-for-Service Payments 
Hospitals that provide services to beneficiaries covered by Part A 
of the Medicare program receive payment through the Inpatient 
 
17. See discussion infra Part II.  
18. See, e.g., Meredith B. Rosenthal et al., Paying for Quality: Providers’ 
Incentives for Quality Improvement, 23 Health Aff. 127, 127 (2004) 
(noting the increasing use by individual purchasers, coalitions, and 
health plans of “pay-for-performance systems to reward providers for 
delivering high-quality care and to motivate quality improvement”).  
19. Instead of an increase in quality as a result of higher spending, the 
Dartmouth Atlas Project found that higher rates of spending in certain 
geographic locations of the country were associated with lower quality 
outcomes. Elliott Fisher et al., Health Care Spending, Quality, and 
Outcomes: More Isn’t Always Better, Dartmouth Inst. for Health 
Pol’y & Clinical Prac. 2 (2009), available at http://www. 
dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/reports/Spending_Brief_022709.pdf.  
20. For a discussion of value-based payments implemented since the passage 
of the ACA, see infra Part II.  
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Prospective Payment System (IPPS).21 The payment is based on the 
categorization of the patient’s principal diagnosis upon discharge, 
along with up to eight comorbidities or complications, according to 
diagnosis-related groups, or DRGs.22 CMS sets the per-discharge 
payment rates for 746 of these groups based on the severity of the 
patient’s case.23 Different weights are assigned to DRGs based on the 
“relative intensity of resource consumption.”24 These weights are then 
multiplied by standardized amounts for labor, non-labor, and capital 
costs, the sum of which represents the cost of an average case treated 
in an efficient hospital.25 Upon calculating the base payment, CMS 
makes a series of adjustments that apply based on the unique 
characteristics of the hospital and its patient population.26 
Physicians who provide care to patients covered by Part B of 
Medicare are paid according to the Resource-Based Relative Value 
Scale (RBRVS).27 Like the DRG system used in Part A, the RBRVS 
is a prospective payment system that accounts for the resources used 
to deliver care to patients in settings outside of the hospital. The 
three components, called relative value units (RVUs), account for 
physician work, practice expense, and malpractice coverage, and they 
vary according to a geographic practice cost index. Each of the RVUs 
is summed and multiplied by a conversion factor approved by  
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (2006) (created by the Social Security Amendments 
of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 601, 97 Stat. 65 as an alternative to cost-
based reimbursement).  
22. Barry R. Furrow et al., Health Law: Cases, Materials and 
Problems 786–87 (6th ed. 2008).  
23. Hospital Acute Inpatient Services Payment System, MedPAC 1 (Oct. 
2009) [hereinafter MedPAC, Payment Primer], available at 
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/MedPAC_Payment_Basics_11_ 
hospital.pdf. 
24. Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 787.  
25. Id.  
26. MedPAC, Payment Primer, supra note 23, at 3–5. A series of 
adjustments are made to the base payment amounts. Hospitals that 
treat with cost-increasing technologies are eligible to receive add-on 
payments based on the technology’s newness and clinical benefit. Id. at 
3. Medicare will cover up to seventy percent of the bad debts incurred 
by hospitals as a result of Medicare beneficiaries not paying deductibles 
and copayments, if the hospitals made a reasonable effort to collect the 
unpaid amounts. Id. Other policy adjustments paid as per-case add-ons 
include indirect graduate medical education payments to assist hospitals 
that incur higher costs while training resident physicians, 
disproportionate share payments to offset the cost of treating large low-
income populations, and outlier payments that provide extra 
reimbursement if a case is extraordinarily costly. Id. at 3–4.  
27. Passed as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. 
L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-4(a)–(j)).  
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Congress.28 Perhaps recognizing the potential for unrestrained growth 
under a fee-for-service prospective payment model, Congress initially 
froze payment rates. The effort was futile, however, because 
physicians altered their practice behavior and increased the volume of 
services provided to patients to compensate for the reduction in 
revenue.29 After several failed attempts to address physician volume 
increases, Congress developed the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) 
formula to calculate the increase (or decrease) in the conversion factor 
that ultimately determines RBRVS payments.30 The formula seeks to 
keep Part B expenditures in line with overall economic growth and is 
based on, among other things, the estimated change in physician fees, 
the number of fee-for-service beneficiaries, and the estimated growth 
in real gross domestic product.31 In the early years after 
implementation of this formula, expenditures remained below the 
target, which allowed Congress to approve conversion factor 
increases.32 In 2002, however, Part B expenditures began to exceed 
SGR targets, and Congress reduced payments by 4.8%.33 Every year 
since then, expenditures have exceeded the formula’s target, but 
Congress has overridden the mandated reductions, or, in at least three 
instances, approved payment increases.34 As a result of Congress’s 
refusal to adhere to the formula, the 2012 SGR update mandated a 
29.5% reduction in provider payments.35 
B. The Inherent Effects of Fee-for-Service Payment 
The fee-for-service reimbursement system used to pay hospitals 
and physicians for providing care to Medicare patients encourages 
greater volume of care, regardless of its quality or necessity.36 The 
 
28. Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 790.  
29. Id.  
30. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4503, 111 Stat. 251, 
433 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(f)).  
31. Jim Hahn & Janemarie Mulvey, Cong. Research Serv., R40907, 
Medicare Physician Payment Updates and the Sustainable 
Growth Rate (SGR) System 3 (2010). 
32. Id. at 4. 
33. Id. at 5–6.  
34. Id.  
35. MedPAC, Report to the Congress: Medicare and the Health 
Care Delivery System 183 (2011), http://www.medpac.gov/ 
documents/jun11_entirereport.pdf.  
36. Rick Mayes, Moving (Realistically) from Volume-Based to Value-Based 
Health Care Payment in the USA Starting with Medicare Payment 
Policy, 16 J. Health Servs. Res. & Pol’y, 249, 249 (2011); see also 
Meredith B. Rosenthal, Beyond Pay for Performance—Emerging Models 
of Provider-Payment Reform, 359 New Eng. J. Med. 1197, 1197 
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incentive to provide care according to volume is two-fold. First, 
increasing the number or the intensity of procedures is a rational 
response to cost-containment initiatives that result in reduced income 
to physician practices.37 Studies dating back to the beginning of the 
DRG payment system have identified the phenomenon of “physician-
induced demand,” which posits that physicians respond to reduced 
practice income by performing a greater volume of procedures.38 
Second, physicians respond to financial incentives present in the fee 
schedules by providing services for which they can obtain 
reimbursement and by minimizing procedures that are not 
reimbursed.39 Since Medicare fee schedules do not reimburse providers 
for chronic care coordination, disease management, or other quality- 
improving activities, providers tend to perform more procedures for 
which reimbursement is possible, thus “fail[ing] to promote or even 
discourag[ing] optimal treatment.”40 
The encouragement that the fee-for-service reimbursement model 
provides physicians also has dramatic implications for cost 
containment. A recent article estimated that wasteful spending arising 
from providing care to patients that will not help them and from 
physician-induced demand was between $158 billion and $226 billion 
in 2011.41 This dramatic level of spending on care that does lead to 
better outcomes has been the primary driver of the shift to value-
based payments.  
C. The Current Health Care Regulatory Structure 
The current regulatory structure in Medicare is largely a product 
of Congress’s response to the incentives created by the fee-for-service 
system. The statutes described below have attempted to counteract 
the natural response of providers to provide more care because each 
additional service can be billed with little or no scrutiny as to its 
value. These regulations embody Congress’s concern with the 
structural relationships of providers and focus on regulating their 
business arrangements and restricting compensation agreements, 
 
(2008); Maria T. Currier & Morris H. Miller, Medicare Payment 
Reform: Accelerating the Transformation of the U.S. Healthcare 
Delivery System and Need for New Strategic Provider Alliances, 
Health Law., Feb. 2010, at 1.  
37. Sandra Christensen, Volume Responses to Exogenous Changes in 
Medicare’s Payment Policies, 27 Health Servs. Res. 65, 66 (1992). 
38. Id.  
39. Mayes, supra note 36, at 249.  
40. Rosenthal et al., supra note 18, at 127. 
41. Donald M. Berwick & Andrew D. Hackbarth, Eliminating Waste in US 
Health Care, 307 JAMA 1513, 1514 (2012).  
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ownership interests, and referral patterns.42 While significant and 
ongoing academic debate continues regarding the efficacy of these 
statutes, this Note will focus primarily on the impact these provisions 
are having on the implementation and expansion of value-based 
payment initiatives currently being introduced to the Medicare 
program.  
1. The Anti-Kickback Statute 
In 1972, Congress enacted the anti-kickback statute to curb 
“certain practices which have long been regarded by professional 
organizations as unethical and which contribute appreciably to the 
cost of the [M]edicare and [M]edicaid programs.”43 Prior to its 
enactment of the modern-day anti-kickback statute, the law 
prohibited only “misrepresentations to obtain Medicare and Medicaid 
payments rather than attacking kickback abuses head on.”44 By 
enacting this new provision, Congress sought to broaden the scope of 
prohibited conduct to include knowing or willful payment or receipt of 
“any remuneration” in exchange for referring an individual, or in 
exchange for purchasing, leasing, or ordering an item financed by a 
federal health care program.45  
 
42. See Kristin Madison, Rethinking Fraud Regulation by Rethinking the 
Health Care System, 32 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y 411, 422 (2011) 
(“[P]ayers’ and patients’ inability to directly evaluate utilization and 
assess quality leads to a regulatory regime reliant on an indirect, 
structural approach that imposes high costs in terms of innovations 
foregone.”).  
43. H.R. Rep. No. 92-231, at 107 (1972); see also Anne W. Morrison, An 
Analysis of Anti-Kickback and Self-Referral Law in Modern Health 
Care, 21 J. Legal Med. 351, 354 (2000) (quoting the House Report 
transcript).  
44. Morrison, supra note 43, at 354.  
45. A series of amendments in 1980, and again in 1987, resulted in the 
current language of the anti-kickback statute: 
(b) Illegal remunerations  
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any 
remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly 
or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind— 
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the 
furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be 
made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program, 
or 
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for 
or recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, 
facility, service, or item for which payment may be made in 
whole or in part under a Federal health care program,  
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be 
fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than 
five years, or both.  
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While the Statute requires a person to knowingly or willfully 
violate its provisions, some courts, namely the Eleventh Circuit, have 
interpreted the intent requirement more broadly to include conduct 
that a defendant knows any aspect of which is unlawful.46 Other 
courts, however, have required the government to meet a higher 
standard by proving that the defendants knew the law “prohibit[ed] 
offering or paying remuneration to induce referrals” and that 
defendants “engage[d] in conduct with the specific intent to violate 
the law.”47 Congress clarified the Statute’s intent requirement in the 
ACA by codifying the broad interpretation of the Eleventh Circuit.48 
After passage of such a broadly worded prohibition in 1972, 
providers hesitated to form new business and payment arrangements 
out of fear that they would face criminal liability or exclusion from 
Medicare.49 This prompted Congress, in 1987, to grant authority to  
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any 
remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly 
or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind— 
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the 
furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be 
made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program, 
or 
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for 
or recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, 
facility, service, or item for which payment may be made in 
whole or in part under a Federal health care program,  
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be 
fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than 
five years, or both.  
 
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006).  
46. See United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833, 838–40 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(noting that a defendant need not act with knowledge that he is 
violating a specific rule; knowledge of general illegality of conduct is 
sufficient).  
47. Corrine Propas Parver & Allison Cohen, The Affordable Care Act: 
Strengthening Compliance Through Health Care Fraud Provisions, 5 
Health L. & Pol’y Brief, no. 1, 2011, at 5–6 (quoting Hanlester 
Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1995)).  
48. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 
6402(f), 124 Stat. 119, 759 (2010) (provision codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
1320a-7b(h)). The amendment states that the government need not 
prove that an individual had actual knowledge of the statute or specific 
intent to violate its terms. Id.  
49. See, e.g., Kusserow, supra note 5, at 51–52 (noting that the broad 
language of the statute created uncertainty, which caused providers to 
be reluctant to “engage in many arrangements which were not harmful 
to the programs and beneficiaries, and which may have even been 
helpful”); Morrison, supra note 43, at 355 (noting a “growing concern 
regarding the vagueness and ambiguity of important terminology” found 
in anti-kickback statutes enacted prior to 1987). 
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the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to promulgate 
safe harbor regulations that, if properly adhered to, would shield 
providers from criminal and administrative action.50 Thus, in addition 
to avoiding liability for failing to act with the requisite intent, 
providers could minimize legal liability by ensuring that their business 
and payment arrangements met the enumerated requirements of a 
safe harbor.  
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has issued twenty-five 
safe harbors;51 however, the safe harbor for personal services and 
management contracts is most relevant in the context of value-based 
payments. A statutory exclusion for bona fide employment 
relationships, while not a regulatory safe harbor, is also commonly 
used in the context of value-based arrangements. The safe harbor for 
personal services and management contracts exempts remuneration 
paid as compensation to providers acting as agents on behalf of 
principals52 and is commonly used for medical directorships53 where 
directors receive a salary but are not employed by the hospital. In 
order to satisfy the requirements, the agreement between the hospital 
and the physician must, among other things, be in writing and signed 
by the parties, specify all of the services that the physician will 
provide over the term, be in place for more than one year, and 
provide compensation that is consistent with fair market value and 
not dependent on the “volume or value of any referrals.”54  
 
50. Kusserow, supra note 5, at 52.  
51. See Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 1070–71.  
52. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d) (2012).  
53. Medical directors typically oversee clinical departments within the 
hospital or supervise the entire medical staff. See, e.g., Harry A. 
Sultz & Kristina M. Young, Health Care USA 82–83 (6th ed. 
2009) (describing the structure commonly found in the medical divisions 
of many hospitals).  
54. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d)(5). Additional requirements include a schedule 
of exact intervals for services, if they are provided on a sporadic or part-
time basis. It should describe the exact length and charge for such 
intervals. Compensation must be consistent with amounts in arms-
length transactions. Id. § 1001.952(d)(3). Lastly, the agreement must be 
commercially reasonable, which OIG interprets as having “intrinsic 
commercial value” to the purchaser that is “reasonably calculated to 
further the business of the . . . purchaser, and must be . . . services that 
the . . . purchaser needs, intends to utilize, and does utilize in 
furtherance of its commercially reasonable business objectives.” Linda A. 
Baumann, Navigating the New Safe Harbors to the Anti-Kickback 
Statute, Health Law., Feb. 2000, at 1, 6  (quoting 64 Fed. Reg. 63,518, 
63,525 (Nov. 19, 1999)).  
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Providers seeking to avoid anti-kickback liability have also relied 
on the exclusion for bona fide employment.55 By employing 
physicians, hospitals are able to structure referrals and payments in 
ways that would not otherwise be protected by a safe harbor. It is 
important to note that independent contractors are not protected by 
the employment exception, and payments to independent contractors 
would need to meet protections of another safe harbor, such as the 
provision for personal services arrangements.56 OIG has adopted the 
same definition of “employee” used by the Internal Revenue Service, 
which is “any individual who would be considered an employee under 
the usual common law rules applicable in determining the existence of 
an employer-employee relationship.”57 While this exception provides 
broad immunity from anti-kickback liability, the option to employ 
physicians to minimize liability is not currently feasible for many 
heath care organizations. As Part III.A discusses, hospitals seeking to 
structure financial arrangements for participation in a value-based 
reimbursement program face the difficult task of trying to minimize 
liability under a statute that was designed, at least in part, to 
prohibit such arrangements.  
2. The Stark Law 
In the late 1980s, Congress turned its attention to the problem of 
physician referrals to entities, especially clinical laboratories, with 
which physicians had an ownership interest or a compensation 
arrangement. A study ordered by Congress found that a sizable 
number of physicians who sought Medicare reimbursement referred 
patients to entities with which they had financial relationships.58 
Because the Medicare Part B program paid physicians according to a 
fee-for-service fee schedule, the prospect of physicians referring 
patients for unnecessary procedures in order to bill Medicare was a 
real threat to the program’s long-term solvency. Indeed, the OIG 
 
55. Instead of appearing in OIG’s safe harbor regulations, the employment 
exemption appears in the statute itself, thus not technically constituting 
a “safe harbor.” The prohibition “shall not apply to any amount paid by 
an employer to an employee (who has a bona fide employment 
relationship with such employer) for employment in the provision of 
covered items or services.” 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(B) (2006).  
56. Kusserow, supra note 5, at 60–61. 
57. Id. at 60 (quoting 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,987 (July 29, 1991)).  
58. Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., OAI-12-88-01410, Financial Arrangements Between 
Physicians and Health Care Businesses: Report to Congress iii 
(1989) [hereinafter OIG Report], available at https://oig. 
hhs.gov/oei/reports/oai-12-88-01410.pdf (finding that twelve percent of 
Medicare physicians have a financial relationship with the entities to 
which they make patient referrals).  
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report noted that patients of physicians who owned or invested in 
outside clinical laboratories received 45 percent more services than 
other Medicare patients.59 To combat this problem, the OIG Report 
identified six options for policymakers hoping to tackle the problem of 
physician self-referral.60 Emboldened by the OIG report and the 
estimated $28 million associated with physician self-referral to clinical 
laboratories,61 Congress, led by Representative Fortney “Pete” Stark, 
implemented the first prohibition on physician referrals for clinical 
laboratory services to entities with which the physician or a family 
member had a financial relationship.62 This prohibition, referred to as 
“Stark I,” paved the way for additional studies of physician referral 
behavior and resulted in additional prohibitions that were enacted  
in 1993.63  
In its current form, the Stark law prohibits physician referrals of 
Medicare or Medicaid patients for designated health services to 
entities with which the physician or a family member has a financial 
interest or compensation arrangement.64 This broad prohibition does 
not require violators to act with a particular mental state. Instead, it 
adopts a “bright line” test for liability, which renders any such 
transaction unlawful unless it meets an exception.65 Entities that 
 
59. Id.  
60. The report recommended (1) implementing “a post payment utilization 
review by carriers directed at physicians who either own or invest in 
other health care entities,” (2) requiring physicians to disclose their 
financial interest to patients, (3) improving enforcement of existing anti-
kickback protections, (4) instituting a private right of action for 
kickbacks, (5) prohibiting physician referrals to certain entities to which 
they have a financial interest, or (6) prohibiting physician referrals to all 
entities to which they have a financial interest. Id. at iv; see also 
Sutton, supra note 8, at 19 (commenting on the results of the OIG 
Report).  
61. OIG Report, supra note 58, at iii.  
62. Sutton, supra note 8, at 19. The provision was passed as part of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 and took effect on January 
1, 1992. Id.  
63. The additional referral prohibitions, referred to as “Stark II,” were 
passed as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. 
L. No. 103-66, § 13562, 107 Stat. 312, 596.  
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a) (2006). Designated health services include clinical 
laboratory services, physical therapy services, occupational therapy 
services, radiology services, radiation therapy services, durable medical 
equipment, parenteral and enteral nutrients and equipment, prosthetics, 
orthotics, and prosthetic devices and supplies, home health services, 
outpatient prescription drugs, and inpatient and outpatient hospital 
services. Id. § 1395nn(h)(6).  
65. See Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 1082. Stark’s exceptions are 
classified as those applying to ownership or investment financial 
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receive overpayments because of a failure to meet the criteria of one 
of the exceptions must follow the Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol 
that was established pursuant to the ACA in September 2010.66 
Penalties include repayment of the claims paid while the violation 
existed,67 civil penalties of $15,000 per service for knowing violations,68 
and exclusion from the Medicare and Medicaid programs with 
penalties up to $100,000 per service where evidence indicates a 
regulatory circumvention scheme.69 CMS has the authority to issue 
advisory opinions to entities requesting review of a specific transaction 
or business arrangement; however, the opinion is binding “as to the 
Secretary and the party or parties requesting the opinion.”70  
Two Stark exceptions play a significant role in the structure of 
compensation arrangements between hospitals and physicians 
attempting to implement value-based payment programs. These 
exceptions include the personal services exception71 and the bona fide 
 
relationships, direct and indirect compensation arrangements, or are 
generic exceptions to all financial arrangements. The law is 
characterized as an “exceptions bill” that enacts a sweeping prohibition 
and then carves out specific exceptions. Id. at 1084–85.  
66. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Report to the 
Congress: Implementation of the Medicare Self-Referral 
Disclosure Protocol i (2012) [hereinafter SRDP Report], available 
at http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Fraud-and-Abuse/PhysicianSelf 
Referral/downloads/CMS-SRDP-Report-to-Congress.pdf. The disclosing 
parties must submit information detailing: the nature of the violation; 
the duration of the violation; the circumstances leading to the discovery 
of the violation and steps taken to address and prevent future issues; 
disclosure of any previous similar conduct or enforcement actions; the 
existence of any compliance program; if applicable, any notices provided 
to other government agencies; and whether the matter is under 
government investigation. Id. at 5. The disclosing party must also 
provide a legal analysis of the suspected violation and identify elements 
of the exception that were and were not satisfied, and, in addition, 
specify the time frame in which the violative arrangement existed. Id. 
The repayment must be accompanied by a financial analysis that 
includes “a total amount actually or potentially due . . . as a result of 
the disclosed violation,” a description of the methodology used to 
calculate the amount, the total remuneration that involved physicians 
(or their family members) received, and a “summary of audit activity 
and documents used in the audit.” Id. at 6.  
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(2).  
68. § 1395nn(g)(3).  
69. § 1395nn(g)(4).  
70. § 1395nn(g)(6).  
71. § 1395nn(e)(3). This exception is commonly used for compensation 
arrangements between hospitals and independent physicians occupying 
management or other hospital-affiliated positions. The exception 
requires the arrangement to be set out in writing, be signed by the 
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employment relationships exception.72 As this Note argues in later 
sections, these exceptions to the Stark law provide inadequate 
protections to providers seeking to re-align physician payments with 
value-based metrics.73 
3. Civil Monetary Penalties Statute  
The Civil Monetary Penalties (CMP) statute,74 while more 
straightforward than the anti-kickback and Stark laws, presents 
perhaps the most significant obstacle to the implementation of value-
based payment initiatives and thus plays an important role in the 
discussion of the current regulatory framework. The statute prohibits 
any hospital from knowingly making a payment to a physician as an 
inducement to reduce or limit services provided to Medicare or 
Medicaid beneficiaries under the direct care of the physician.75 
Hospitals making such payments can be liable for civil penalties of up 
to $2,000 for each beneficiary for which a payment is made.76 
Physicians who knowingly accept the payment may themselves be 
liable for up to $2,000 for each beneficiary for which a payment  
is made.77  
The OIG has interpreted the statutory language broadly to 
prohibit any payment that is intended to influence the physician to 
reduce or limit items or services.78 Further clarifying its reading of the 
 
parties, and specify the services that will be covered. The services 
contracted for must not “exceed those that are reasonable and necessary 
for the legitimate business purposes of the arrangement[s].” Id. The 
arrangement must last for at least one year, and the compensation must 
be set out in advance, must not exceed fair market value, and must not 
take into account the volume or value of any referrals. Id.  
72. § 1395nn(e)(2). This exception provides broad protection for hospital-
physician transactions and compensation arrangements and its use has 
grown as hospitals and physician organizations align to form 
accountable care organizations. The exception requires employment to 
be for identifiable services, and remuneration must be consistent with 
fair market value and not be determined in a manner that takes into 
account the volume or value of any referrals. Productivity bonuses are 
not prohibited for services performed personally by the physician, and 
remuneration under the agreement must be commercially reasonable. Id.  
73. See discussion infra Part III.  
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (2006).  
75. § 1320a-7a(b)(1). 
76. Id.  
77. § 1320a-7a(b)(2). 
78. Anne B. Claiborne, Julia R. Hesse & Daniel T. Roble, Legal 
Impediments to Implementing Value-Based Purchasing in Healthcare, 35 
Am. J.L. & Med. 442, 445 (2009).  
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statute with respect to gainsharing,79 the OIG stated in 1999 that 
appropriately structured gainsharing arrangements were prohibited, 
without regard to necessity or prudence as informed by current 
medical practice, even though they may provide financial benefit to 
the provider without an adverse impact on the quality of care.80 The 
CMP has complicated recent efforts by hospitals to implement 
gainsharing agreements as part of broader value-based reimbursement 
initiatives that would allow physicians to share in the overall cost 
savings they deliver to the hospital.81 Recently, however, the OIG 
signaled some willingness to relax its interpretation of the provision in 
a series of advisory opinions82 that approved “carefully-tailored” 
gainsharing agreements.83  
Another provision of the CMP statute relating to beneficiary 
inducement is applicable to value-based payment programs. The 
statute prohibits offering remuneration to any Medicare or Medicaid 
beneficiary that a person knows or should know is likely to influence 
the beneficiary to seek care from a particular provider for which 
payment is made under the Medicare or Medicaid programs.84 Certain 
value-based delivery models conflict with this prohibition because 
they offer items or services for free or below fair market value in an 
attempt to influence patient behavior. As with the provision relating 
to the reduction or limitation of services, there have been recent 
 
79. Gainsharing refers to arrangements where hospitals give physicians a 
share of any reduction in the hospital’s costs that can be attributed to 
the physician’s clinical behavior. Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 
1079.  
80. Gainsharing Arrangements and CMPs for Hospital Payments to 
Physicians to Reduce or Limit Services to Beneficiaries, 64 Fed. Reg. 
37,985 (July 14, 1999).  
81. See Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 1079–80 (noting the 
government’s concern for “black box” gainsharing arrangements in 
which physicians receive money for overall cost savings without 
disclosing what specific actions were taken to generate those savings).  
82. Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., Advisory Opinion Nos. 05-01 to 05-06 (2005), available at 
https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/archives/advisory-
opinions/index.asp#2005.  
83. Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 1080. Some narrowly targeted 
agreements have been permitted where hospitals seek to reduce the use 
of costly supplies and procedures, or where they seek to employ less 
expensive clinical practices that reduce costs. Id. at 1079. Such 
agreements have been carefully designed with significant safeguards, 
including identification of the specific actions physicians are taking to 
reduce costs, external medical review of each cost-savings measure, and 
case-by-case evaluations with physician independence to choose the most 
appropriate treatment. Id. at 1080.  
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(5) (2006).  
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developments with the CMP for beneficiary inducement and the 
OIG’s application of the provision to newer forms of value-based 
payment. These developments are discussed in Part IV.  
II. The Trend Toward Value-Based Payments 
In recent years, Congress has become increasingly concerned with 
the unrestrained growth in Medicare expenditures. This has been 
attributed, at least in part, to a method of reimbursement that 
rewards providers for increasing the volume and intensity of medical 
procedures with little regard for their quality or value to the patient.85 
The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, or MedPAC, which 
advises Congress on issues related to Medicare payment policy, has 
encouraged Congress to develop payment reforms that focus on the 
bundling of payments across care settings and providers.86 In addition, 
the Commission recommended the development of integrated care 
delivery systems, commonly referred to as Accountable Care 
Organizations, or ACOs, which use incentives to produce “high-
quality, well-coordinated health care while containing growth in the 
cost of such services.”87 Congress accepted these recommendations and 
included authorizing language for their development in the ACA.88  
A. How Value-Based Payment Differs from Fee for Service 
As discussed in the beginning of this Note, the chief criticism of 
the fee-for-service model is that it functions to reward providing a 
greater volume of care that tends to be more costly.89 To move 
beyond blind reimbursement for services without any regard for their 
value, reform advocates have encouraged value-based alternatives. 
Paying for value attempts to realign the financial incentives of care 
delivery by tying physician compensation to achievement of evidence-
based clinical standards.90 While there has been significant praise for 
 
85. See Currier & Miller, supra note 36, at 1 (noting that Medicare should 
transform “‘from being a passive bill-payer to an active purchaser of 
healthcare’”) (citing Nancy McCall et al., Rates of Hospitalization for 
Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions in the Medicare+Choice 
Population, 22 Health Care Fin. Rev. 127, 127 (2001)).  
86. Id. at 3.  
87. Id. at 5.  
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a) (Supp. V 2011) (establishing the Medicare 
Shared Savings Program and associated ACOs); 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4(a) 
(Supp. V 2011) (establishing the National Program on Payment 
Bundling). These provisions and their implementation are discussed 
infra Parts II.C–D. 
89. See discussion supra Part I.B.  
90. See Michael F. Cannon, Pay-for-Performance: Is Medicare a Good 
Candidate?, 7 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 1, 3 (2007) 
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the idea of linking Medicare payments to value and quality, 
considerable difficulties in defining and measuring “value” and 
“quality” have persisted.91 Despite these difficulties, CMS has been 
experimenting with various forms of quality measurement in value-
based payment initiatives that began long before the ACA was even 
contemplated.  
B. Value-Based Purchasing 
One of the earliest Medicare value-driven demonstration projects 
was the Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (HQID), which 
began in 2003. CMS attempted to determine whether financial 
incentives could improve inpatient care measures in five high-cost 
areas: acute myocardial infarction, coronary artery bypass surgery, 
heart failure, community-acquired pneumonia, and hip and knee 
replacement.92 Each hospital received a score based on composite 
quality measures,93 the majority of which were process metrics that 
indicated the percentage of patients who received a specified 
treatment. Using composite data from these metrics, CMS awarded 
two-percent bonus payments on hospital DRG payments for the 
condition for hospitals in the top decile of participants.94 Hospitals in 
the second decile received a one-percent bonus.95 In response to 
criticism that the poorest-performing hospitals were not being 
rewarded for their sustained improvement, payments were adjusted in 
the second phase, which lasted from 2007 to 2009, to reward hospitals 
that demonstrated year-over-year improvement.96 In 2011, CMS  
(describing how financial rewards can be used to affect the performance 
of a physician).  
91. For an excellent discussion of the difficulties and implications associated 
with defining quality, see id. at 5–8. Cannon notes that quality can be 
measured in four ways: patient outcomes, processes, structural factors 
(facilities and equipment), and patient satisfaction. Id. at 5. These 
quality measures are each associated with a unique set of benefits and 
drawbacks and are likely to be impacted by the availability and quality 
of the data used to calculate them. See id. at 7–10 (discussing the 
numerous upsides and downsides likely to result from quality measures).  
92. David Mechanic, The Truth About Health Care: Why Reform 
is Not Working in America 122 (2006).  
93. Id.  
94. Id.  
95. Id.  
96. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Premier Hospital 
Quality Incentive Demonstration Rewarding Superior Quality 
Care: Fact Sheet 3 (2011), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-
Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/HospitalQualityInits/ 
Downloads/HospitalPremierPressRelease-FactSheet.pdf (noting that 
incentive payments were given to hospitals based on quality score 
improvement over the past few years). The project extension also 
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indicated that, among the 216 participating hospitals, the composite 
quality score improved by an average of 18.6 percent across each of 
the five measured areas.97  
The results of this demonstration informed the design of the new 
Value Based Purchasing (VBP) Program, which went into effect for 
all Medicare-participating hospitals on October 1, 2012.98 Under the 
new VBP Program,99 Medicare will withhold one percent of regular 
DRG reimbursements, and, over the course of a year, money will be 
paid to hospitals based on their adherence to clinical guidelines and 
their performance on patient satisfaction surveys.100 Seventy percent 
of the hospitals’ ratings correspond to clinical process measures, while 
the remaining thirty percent is derived from satisfaction survey 
responses from discharged patients.101 
C. Shared Savings Programs and the Development of ACOs 
The Medicare Physician Group Practice (PGP) Demonstration102 
represented the first large-scale attempt to pay physicians according 
 
imposed a one percent DRG penalty on hospitals that did not score 
above the ninth decile in any clinical area in year four. A two percent 
reduction was imposed for hospitals failing to score above the tenth 
decile in any clinical area in year four. Id.  
97. Id. at 2.  
98. Jordan M. VanLare & Patrick H. Conway, Value-Based Purchasing—
National Programs to Move from Volume to Value, 367 New Eng. J. 
Med. 292, 293 (2012); Jordan Rau, Medicare’s Pay for Performance 
Effort Begins, Targeting Quality and Readmissions, Capsules: The 
KHN Blog (Oct. 1, 2012, 6:06 AM), http://capsules.kaiserhealthnews. 
org/index.php/2012/10/medicares-pay-for-performance-effort-begins-
targeting-quality-and-readmissions/.  
99. The VBP Program was created by the ACA and appears at 42 U.S.C. § 
1395ww(o)(1) (Supp. V 2011). 
100. Rau, supra note 98. A hospital’s performance may allow it to recoup 
some of the DRG payment reduction, and hospitals that achieve higher 
ratings can potentially receive extra. Hospitals that underperform will 
likely fail to recoup the one percent DRG reduction. Over time, 
Medicare will increase the amount initially withheld from DRG 
payments, and new quality measures will be added. Id.  
101. Id.  
102. Medicare, Medicaid, and State Child Health Insurance Program Benefits 
Improvement and Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 
Stat. 2763 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-1(a) (2006)). The 
demonstration began in April 2005 and concluded in March 2010. All 
ten physician groups are participating in a two-year transition 
demonstration, which began in January 2011. Ctrs. for Medicare & 
Medicaid Servs., Medicare Physician Group Practice 
Demonstration: Physicians Continue to Improve Quality and 
Generate Savings Under Medicare Physician Pay-for-
Performance Demonstration 9 (2011), https://www.cms.gov/ 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
Walking a Tightrope 
1397 
to value using a shared savings model. The demonstration used shared 
savings to encourage cost efficiency and quality improvement by 
allowing participating physician groups to retain a portion of the 
savings generated by reducing the cost of managing the health of a 
defined population of Medicare patients and improving quality.103  
The demonstration was structured to compare the annual 
expenditure growth of the PGP-participating patient population to 
that of the local nonparticipating patient population. Patients who 
received the largest share of their services from the participating 
group practice were assigned to the PGP for expenditure 
comparison.104 If the group practice successfully held expenditures for 
its assigned patients more than two percent below the target, the 
practice was eligible for a performance payment of a percentage of the 
total savings.105 Medicare received the remaining amount.106 An 
additional quality performance payment was determined, based on the 
group’s achievement of thirty-two quality measures.107 If all targets 
were met, the PGP received the maximum quality performance 
payment; however, Medicare retained a portion of the payment if the 
PGP did not meet all targets.108 Data for these quality measures were 
derived from claims submissions and patient record abstractions.109  
Building on the shared savings approach in the PGP 
demonstration, Congress created the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program in the ACA.110 The program encourages providers to develop 
accountable care organizations, or ACOs, which bring together 
disparate groups of providers to assume responsibility for the medical 
 
Medicare/Demonstration-Projects/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/ 
PGP_Fact_Sheet.pdf.  
103. John Kautter et al., Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration 
Design: Quality and Efficiency Pay-for-Performance, 29 Health Care 
Fin. Rev., no. 1, 2007, at 15, 16. The project required a higher level of 
administrative and clinical capability, which limited participation to ten 
large physician groups viewed as having the capacity to respond to the 
incentives and track the necessary quality measures. Id. at 17.  
104. Id. at 18. Patients who received a plurality of their outpatient 
evaluation and management services from the participating PGP during 
a given year were eligible for assignment. Id.  
105. Id. at 21.  
106. Id. Initially, the group practice retained eighty percent of the savings, 
while Medicare retained twenty percent. In the third, and final, year of 
the demonstration, both parties shared in the savings equally. Id.  
107. Id. at 24.  
108. Id. at 21.  
109. Id. at 25.  
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a) (Supp. V 2011). 
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care delivered to a population of patients.111 The providers who 
assume responsibility for the care of the population are encouraged to 
coordinate care, reduce costs, and improve quality.112 ACOs can take 
on a variety of organizational forms,113 but a series of statutory 
requirements apply to all participating entities.114  
The shared savings payment structure still relies on the Medicare 
fee-for-service system, but the value-based element of shared savings 
encourages providers to meet cost reduction benchmarks and rewards 
them if they hold down costs.115 To establish a relative baseline 
against which the ACO’s performance will be measured, the ACO and 
Medicare will agree on the historic costs of providing medical care to 
the patient population assigned to the ACO, taking into account the 
anticipated changes in health care costs for factors like age and health 
 
111. David Newman, Cong. Research Serv., R41474, Accountable 
Care Organizations and the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program 8 (2010). 
112. Id. at 2.  
113. While hospitals are not a necessary part of an ACO, the government 
believes they will be central to their creation because hospitals are 
better positioned to provide capital for increased staffing, health 
information technology investments, and electronic health records 
deployment. In addition, hospitals have the legal resources to contract 
with the government and other providers, and they are better positioned 
to develop integrated care processes. See id. at 7–8 (discussing reasons 
why ACO integration is likely). These hospitals could employ physicians 
directly through an integrated delivery system, or they could enter into 
joint ventures with independent physician practices and operate a non-
employee medical staff. See id. at 4 (comparing the characteristics of 
various models of hospitals). Other forms of ACOs do not require 
hospitals at all. Instead, they rely either on associations of independent 
physician practices that contract jointly with health plans to coordinate 
care and improve quality, or they involve virtual physician networks led 
by individual physicians or local foundations capable of providing 
leadership and infrastructure to coordinate care. Id. 
114. All ACOs must agree to: (1) become accountable for the quality, cost, 
and care of the Medicare beneficiaries assigned to them, (2) participate 
in the program for at least three years, (3) have a formal legal structure 
to allow for the receipt and distribution of shared savings payments to 
providers and suppliers, (4) include sufficient primary care professionals 
to provide care to the beneficiaries assigned to ACO, (5) have at least 
5,000 fee-for-service beneficiaries assigned to the ACO, (6) create a 
leadership and management structure that includes administrative and 
clinical systems, and (7) define processes to promote evidence-based 
medicine, patient engagement, quality and cost measures, and care 
coordination. 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b)(2)(A)–(G) (Supp. V 2011).  
115. See Newman, supra note 111, at 9 (describing the benefits of using an 
ACO in Medicare fee for service). 
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status.116 ACOs that enroll in the traditional Shared Savings Program 
will assume no risk for failing to achieve savings, and providers will 
still receive the full Medicare fee-for-service rate regardless.117 Those 
ACOs that achieve savings relative to the baseline will retain a 
portion of that amount to be distributed to providers according to the 
organization’s individual business arrangement with ACO 
stakeholders.118 Performance based on Medicare-defined quality 
measures will also affect the portion of savings retained by  
the ACO.119 
The government believes the prospect of sharing in any savings 
generated creates an incentive to reduce the volume and intensity of 
medical procedures, while the potential to receive a bonus for 
achieving quality performance measures reduces the likelihood that 
providers will stint on care. And, while most quality measures will 
likely consist of simple process metrics initially, CMS is expected to 
continue developing more sophisticated, evidence-based quality 
measures and reporting requirements for future implementation.120 As 
providers continue to adopt electronic health record (EHR) systems 
and conform to the meaningful use regulations,121 the Medicare 
program will be positioned to take advantage of providers’ clinical 
monitoring capabilities and use abstracted EHR data to assure quality 
of care. The implications of this capability regarding the development 
of a new Medicare regulatory structure are discussed in Part V.  
 
116. Id. These beneficiaries will be assigned based on where they receive the 
majority of their primary care in the prior year. Id.  
117. Id. More advanced integrated care providers participating in the Pioneer 
ACO model will face downside risk by being held accountable for a 
portion of the losses relative to the benchmark. See Ctrs. for 
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Pioneer Accountable Care 
Organization (ACO) Model Program: Frequently Asked 
Questions 3 (2012), http://innovations.cms.gov/Files/x/Pioneer-ACO-
Model-Frequently-Asked-Questions-doc.pdf. In the third year of the 
program, Pioneer ACOs will transition to a population-based payment 
model, which replaces a significant portion of the fee-for-service system 
with a per-beneficiary per-month payment that resembles capitation. Id. 
The results of this model will be used to inform future rulemaking 
related to the Shared Savings Program. Id. at 1.  
118. Newman, supra note 111, at 9.  
119. Id.  
120. Id. at 10.  
121. To receive incentive payments under the Medicare and Medicaid 
Incentive Programs, which help offset the cost of implementing new 
EHR systems, providers must certify that they are “meaningfully using” 
EHR technology by meeting objectives established by CMS. The 
requirements for eligible professionals and hospitals appear at 42 C.F.R. 
§ 495.210 (2012).  
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D. Bundling Payments by Episode of Care 
Episodic payment bundling is an alternative to fee-for-service 
payment that packages the payments of multiple providers into a 
single lump sum payment corresponding with the treatment of a 
patient’s condition.122 Instead of Medicare reimbursing hospitals under 
Part A and physicians and other professionals under Part B, the 
program encourages all providers to coordinate treatment across 
multiple specialties and deliver more efficient care, while ensuring 
quality through monitoring and improvement protocols.123 CMS has 
developed a series of payment bundling models as part of a 
demonstration project established by the ACA.124 While the models 
have subtle differences, each of them attempts to bundle all services 
associated with inpatient care with those services needed for a defined 
period after discharge from the hospital. Since the bundled payment 
establishes a target for a given condition, all providers, including 
hospitals, physicians, and related health practitioners involved in the 
patient’s treatment and recovery up to 30-90 days post-discharge, 
have an incentive to hold costs below the bundled amount and share 
the savings.125 If costs for treating the patient for the condition exceed 
the target, the provider must pay the difference back to Medicare.126  
While there may be consensus among policymakers that the 
Medicare program can no longer pay for medical services using a 
reimbursement model that encourages overtreatment and poor  
122. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Bundled Payments 
for Care Improvement Initiative: Frequently Asked Questions 
4 (2012) [hereinafter Bundled Payment FAQs], available at 
http://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/Bundled-Payments-FAQ.pdf 
(describing how various models of payment function).  
123. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,  Bundled Payments for 
Care Improvement Initiative: Fact Sheet 1 (2011) [hereinafter 
Bundled Payment Fact Sheet], available at http://www.phprwi. 
com/Partner_Resource_Docs/Fact-Sheet-Bundled-Payment-
FINAL82311.pdf. 
124. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4(a)(1) (Supp. V 2011). Each of the three 
retrospective payment models use agreed-upon targets calculated using 
the historical costs of providing care for specified conditions and then 
discounting those costs to arrive at a bundled payment for the episode. 
Providers still bill using the fee-for-service system, but the final amount 
paid by Medicare is reconciled with the target. When providers remain 
below the target, they are permitted to retain the excess payment; 
however, providers do not receive additional payments if costs exceed 
the target. The prospective model uses established payments that are 
automatically distributed to the hospital, which then has the 
responsibility of distributing the bundled payment across involved 
providers. See Bundled Payment Fact Sheet, supra note 123, at 3.  
125. Bundled Payment Fact Sheet, supra note 123, at 3.  
126. Bundled Payment FAQs, supra note 122, at 4.  
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coordination of care,127 significant regulatory barriers remain. As Part 
I discussed, the regulatory framework currently in existence is highly 
complex and was structured to combat fraud and abuse in the fee-for-
service system.128 The difficulties imposed by the current regulatory 
structure on the implementation of new value-based payment methods 
and care delivery reforms are significant. Part III examines these 
difficulties and begins to critique the approach that CMS has taken to 
alleviate some of the restrictions posed by the fraud-and-abuse 
regulations.  
III. Value-Based Reimbursement and the Existing 
Regulatory Framework 
Provider efforts to implement value-based reimbursement models 
will almost certainly be met with an array of conflicts related to the 
existing fraud-and-abuse regulatory framework. As mentioned above, 
the existing regulatory structure was designed to combat abuse of the 
fee-for-service reimbursement system. To preserve the financial health 
of the federal health care programs, legislators and regulators focused 
on indirect control over financial relationships and ownership interests 
among providers. Now, in an era of integrated care delivery and 
changed financial incentives, physicians must begin to develop 
relationships in ways that conflict with these existing regulations. 
While it remains possible to implement value-based reimbursement 
programs under current regulations, doing so curtails the scope of the 
program, and it requires innovative providers to assume the risk that 
their arrangement could become the first example of what is not 
permitted under existing regulations. As a result, providers have 
moved forward, if at all, with an abundance of caution that could 
chill innovation and impact the timeline for adopting cost-reducing 
payment models. 
A. Conflicts with the Anti-Kickback Statute 
Currently, the anti-kickback statute does not provide a safe 
harbor for the gainsharing-type arrangements found in shared savings 
payment models. Though the statute is intent-based, and thus 
requires the government to prove that a payment was made with 
knowledge to induce referrals, providers would still seek to minimize 
liability by fitting the gainsharing payments into an existing safe 
harbor or by requesting an advisory opinion from the OIG. The most 
 
127. See Ezekiel Emanuel et al., A Systematic Approach to Containing 
Health Care Spending, 367 New Eng. J. Med. 949, 950 (2012) (noting 
the views of several prominent health policy experts and their support 
for the accelerated adoption of fee-for-service alternatives in Medicare).  
128. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
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favored safe harbor under the statute, however, is not even a safe 
harbor at all. As noted in Part I, the statute does not define 
“remuneration” to include money paid as compensation to bona fide 
employees.129 This broad exception has led many large integrated care 
providers to employ physicians to avoid scrutiny under the statute. 
Another option available to providers seeking to shield 
gainsharing-type payments from anti-kickback scrutiny is the safe 
harbor for personal service arrangements and management contracts. 
As discussed in Part I, the requirements for the safe harbor are 
complex.130 The most difficult requirements, however, are that 
aggregate compensation paid to the physician over the term of the 
agreement be set out in advance, consistent with fair market value, 
and not take into consideration the volume or value of referrals.131 For 
hospitals attempting to make shared savings payments to physicians, 
these requirements present risks because hospitals may not know the 
aggregate dollar figure of payments at the beginning of the agreement. 
Additionally, determining the fair market value for shared savings 
payments presents problems because the payments are outside the 
“existing paradigm of fair market value fees being measured in terms 
of hours of service provided.”132 Because of these difficulties and 
uncertainties, providers are often unwilling to rely on the purported 
protection of the safe harbor. Providers who choose to rely on the 
incomplete protection of the safe harbor cite the intent requirement as 
a primary justification. With contemporaneous documentation and a 
business justification for the payments, some providers are willing to 
proceed without any greater protection on the basis that knowledge to 
pay remuneration to induce referrals could not be proven in any 
enforcement action.133  
One remaining option for providers who have sought a greater 
level of protection has been to request an advisory opinion from OIG. 
OIG has issued several advisory opinions approving gainsharing 
arrangements between hospitals and identifiable groups of 
 
129. See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text.  
130. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.  
131. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d) (2012) (establishing all of the requirements 
that must be met in order to exclude payments that would otherwise 
constitute remuneration under the statute).  
132. Robert F. Leibenluft et al., Hospital-Physician Collaborations: Antitrust 
and Health Care Fraud and Abuse Considerations, in Health Law 
Handbook 251, 270 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 2009).  
133. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-12-355, Medicare: 
Implementation of Financial Incentive Programs Under 
Federal Fraud and Abuse Laws 20 n.68 (2012) [hereinafter GAO 
Financial Incentive Report].  
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physicians.134 Approved gainsharing plans have included payments 
made by hospitals to cardiology and radiology groups at a rate of fifty 
percent of the annual savings achieved by physician implementation 
of cost-saving recommendations.135 Providers opting for an advisory 
opinion face significant costs—and risks—as the requesting party 
must pay OIG to evaluate the proposal and prepare an advisory 
statement.136 Furthermore, the requesting party must seek review of 
an existing or proposed financial arrangement, since OIG will not 
respond to hypotheticals or general questions of interpretation.137 Any 
advisory opinions issued by OIG are binding only between the 
requesting party and the Secretary of HHS.138 While many 
organizations and their legal counsel look to these advisory opinions 
for guidance in structuring their financial incentive programs, the 
opinions do not provide an absolute shield from liability, and the 
slightest difference in circumstances could affect the applicability of 
the advisory opinion to the relying party’s arrangement.139 
B. Conflicts with the Stark Law 
The potential for liability under the Stark law is much broader. 
As mentioned in Part I, the statute imposes strict liability on 
violators unless their conduct falls within one of the recognized 
exceptions. In the context of shared savings and ACOs, the Stark law 
would be easily implicated because of the compensation arrangements 
involving physicians who make referrals to the hospital for designated 
health services.140 Similar to the anti-kickback statute, there is no 
Stark exception that applies directly to shared savings or other 
incentive payments. The absence of explicit protection under the 
strict liability statute leaves providers with a patchwork of existing 
exceptions that provide only limited protection to value-based 
payment programs.  
Perhaps the most comprehensive protection offered by the Stark 
law as it relates to gainsharing is the exception for bona fide 
employment relationships. Under this exception, the agreement must 
 
134. Claiborne et al., supra note 78, at 489.  
135. Id. at 489 n.249.  
136. GAO Financial Incentive Report, supra note 133, at 12–13, 13 
n.49.  
137. Id. at 12 n.46.  
138. Id. at 12.  
139. Id. 
140. Carrie Valiant, Stark Law Implications for ACOs: Fitting a Square Peg 
into a Round Hole, Accountable Care News, Jan. 2011, at 1, 7, 
available at http://www.ebglaw.com/files/42796_Valiant-Accountable-
Care-News-Stark-Law.pdf.  
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show that employment is for identifiable services, the amount paid is 
consistent with fair market value, the amount does not take into 
consideration the volume or value of any referrals, and the amount 
paid is commercially reasonable.141 In large part, this exception 
protects the distribution of shared savings between hospitals and 
employed physicians. Lingering risks include ensuring that payments 
to physicians remain consistent with fair market value and that 
payments are commercially reasonable; however, the measurability of 
fair market value for services meeting a “clinically based outcome 
measure for a financial incentive program to improve quality” is 
unclear.142 To overcome this difficulty, some agreements ensure that 
total physician compensation, including all incentive payments and 
other sources of income, remains consistent with fair market value.143 
To meet the requirement that payment not depend on volume or 
value of referrals, some incentive payment plans are structured to pay 
physicians the same amount of money, regardless of their contribution 
to the savings generated.144 The effects of rewarding physicians equally 
for making an unequal contribution to achieve savings may have 
adverse effects on changing physician habits and improving the 
quality of care;145 however, such a review is beyond the scope of  
this Note.  
More complex issues arise when the relationship between 
coordinating parties does not involve an employment relationship 
protected by the broad bona fide employment exception. Hospitals 
seeking to distribute shared savings payments to non-employed 
physicians have sought protection under the personal services 
arrangement exception146 and fair market value compensation 
exception.147 While some minor differences exist between the 
exceptions, parties seeking to meet the requirements of either 
 
141. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(2) (2006). 
142. GAO Financial Incentive Report, supra note 133, at 21.  
143. See Kevin G. McAnaney, Kim Mobley & Claire Turcotte, 
American Health Lawyers Association Annual Meeting: 
Governance Best Practices for Physician Compensation and 
Contracting 34–38 (June 28–29, 2011) [hereinafter AHLA Best 
Practices], available at http://www.healthlawyers.org/Events/ 
Programs/Materials/ Documents /AM11/mcananey_mobley_turcotte_ 
slides.pdf (presentation describing some of the issues associated with the 
fair market value and “set in advance” requirements under Stark and 
noting that fair market value analysis should be performed on total 
compensation, including incentive-based components). 
144. GAO Financial Incentive Report, supra note 133, at 21.  
145. Id.  
146. 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(d) (2012).  
147. § 411.357(l).  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
Walking a Tightrope 
1405 
exception have faced similar difficulties. Both exceptions require that 
compensation under the agreement: (1) be set out in advance; (2) be 
consistent with fair market value; (3) not take into account the 
volume or value of referrals or other business generated by the 
referring physician; and (4) be commercially reasonable.148 Unlike with 
the employment exception, the personal services exception often is not 
applied in situations where hospitals can bundle the physician’s base 
salary and the incentive-based compensation received from a 
gainsharing arrangement together to perform a fair market value 
analysis. In the employment context, hospitals receive greater 
protection from errors in fair market value calculations because a 
sizable portion of the compensation (the base salary) can be verified 
by third party surveys. The personal services arrangement and fair 
market value exceptions, in contrast, are typically reserved for 
physicians who are not employed by the health system, and thus a 
significant portion, if not the entirety, of the physician’s payment 
from the health system is derived from shared savings payments for 
which no objective third party fair market value survey exists. 
Structuring compensation arrangements in ways that have not 
been explicitly approved by CMS creates a significant risk for 
providers. Performing fair market value analysis on incentive-based 
payments, as alluded to above, is difficult, if not impossible, and CMS 
has not provided certainty in this area. Additionally, it is difficult for 
hospitals and health systems to know at least one year in advance 
what the total compensation under the agreement will be; however, 
CMS has been receptive to the inclusion of formulas that will be used 
to calculate incentive-based compensation that is subject to outcome 
metrics.149 As with the anti-kickback statute, providers have the 
option of seeking an advisory opinion from CMS. While the published 
opinion binds only the requesting party and the Secretary of HHS,150 
other parties have relied on the language to craft incentive payment 
programs consistent with what CMS has previously sanctioned. Some 
parties cite the statistic that CMS and OIG have not taken any Stark 
or anti-kickback enforcement actions regarding pay-for-performance or 
gainsharing arrangements from 2005 to 2010.151 The threat of 
becoming the first provider targeted by such an enforcement action, 
however, has caused providers to implement programs with caution.152  
148. Id.; § 411.357(d). 
149. See AHLA Best Practices, supra note 143, at 34 (noting that 
quality-based payments to independent contractor physicians may meet 
the “set in advance” requirement for Stark if the formula is set forth in 
the agreement).  
150. GAO Financial Incentive Report, supra note 133, at 12.  
151. Id. at 23.  
152. Id.  
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As discussed below, the lack of clarity and protection offered to 
providers attempting to implement value-based payment models using 
a regulatory framework directed toward fee for service has a chilling 
effect that could unnecessarily delay innovation.  
In an early attempt to address these issues, CMS, in 2008, issued 
a proposed rule153 outlining an exception for incentive payment 
programs and shared savings programs.154 The 16-element exception 
adopted many of the safeguards that were adopted in favorable OIG 
advisory opinions related to gainsharing under the anti-kickback 
statute.155 The rule was never finalized, and HHS later stated that it is 
questionable “how a physician self-referral exception could be 
designed given that any new exception under [Stark] must present no 
risk of program or patient abuse.”156 Providers have since relied on 
favorable advisory opinions issued by CMS that contain many of the 
provisions of the proposed rule; however, parties relying on advisory 
opinions that are not binding between themselves and the Secretary of 
HHS will not likely receive any legal immunity.157 
C. Conflicts with the CMP Statute 
The CMP statute creates a straightforward prohibition on 
gainsharing initiatives in which providers receive a share of the 
savings generated from reducing or limiting care in any way, 
regardless of medical necessity.158 Unlike with the anti-kickback 
statute and the Stark law, the CMP statute does not provide a 
measure of protection in the form of a safe harbor or exception if 
 
153. Proposed Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee 
Schedule and Revisions to E-Prescribing Exemption Amendment, 73 
Fed. Reg. 38,502, 38,604 (proposed July 7, 2008).  
154. Claiborne et al., supra note 78, at 487. 
155. Id. The proposed rule would have guarded against some of the risks 
associated with gainsharing, including: “limitations on costly services 
(‘stinting’); favoring of healthier or cheaper patients (‘cherry picking’); 
disfavoring of sicker or more expensive patients (‘steering’); 
inappropriately limiting length of stay (‘quicker and sicker discharge’); 
or generating abusive referrals through improperly increased percentage 
payments to physicians or manipulating outcomes data.” Id. The 
proposed rule allowed gainsharing programs to last up to three years 
and required that: at least five physicians participate in each quality 
measure, all physicians in a given department be permitted to 
participate, and all physicians be on the medical staff at the outset of 
the program. Id. at 487–88.  
156. Notice of Meeting, 75 Fed. Reg. 57,039, 57,041 (Sept. 17, 2010); see also 
Valiant, supra note 140, at 8 (quoting the notice in the Federal 
Register).  
157. Claiborne et al., supra note 78, at 488.  
158. See supra notes 74–83 and accompanying text.  
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certain requirements are met. Providers attempting to create narrow 
gainsharing arrangements are instead left to rely on nonbinding 
statements from the OIG that offer no guaranteed protection from 
penalties, except as between the Secretary and the entity to which the 
opinion is addressed.159  
Recently, the OIG has allowed for “carefully tailored” gainsharing 
agreements that meet certain requirements.160 While this measure of 
relief allowed for some gainsharing arrangements to proceed, nearly all 
of them have been limited to individual service lines,161 particularly in 
the form of clinical co-management agreements. Even where other 
providers attempt to strictly replicate a gainsharing arrangement that 
OIG has explicitly approved, the impact the programs have on 
achieving high quality and value is limited because of the constraints 
that OIG places on the program.162 Without changing the way in 
which the CMP statute is applied and enforced, however, the statute 
would continue to present the “most direct constraints on the 
financial and clinical integration between physicians and hospital[s] 
where the goal of integration is efficiency.”163 As a result of this 
limitation on the expansion of high-value care, the broad applicability 
of the CMP statute was a prime candidate for reform when Congress 
was contemplating the transition from fee-for-service to value-based 
payment.  
IV. The Legislative Response: Fraud-and-Abuse 
Waivers 
As part of the ACA, Congress granted waiver authority to the 
Secretary of HHS that would allow for provisions of the anti-kickback 
statute, the Stark law, and the CMP statute to be waived in 
connection with approved demonstration projects.164 CMS exercised 
 
159. See supra notes 74–83 and accompanying text.  
160. Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 1080; see also supra note 83 
(describing the characteristics of approved gainsharing arrangements).  
161. Id. 
162. See GAO Financial Incentive Report, supra note 133, at 31 (noting 
that permissible gainsharing arrangements are narrow and permit 
specific cost-saving limitations, for instance limits on use of certain 
surgical supplies and product substitutions). Another limitation in 
approved gainsharing arrangements is that payments for financial 
incentives must also be distributed equally per capita, regardless of the 
level of effort by the physician. Id.  
163. Leibenluft et al., supra note 132, at 267–68.  
164. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 
3022(f), 124 Stat. 119, 398 (2010) (provision codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
1395jjj(f) (2012)). 
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this new waiver authority and promulgated an interim final rule with 
comment (IFC) that specified five waivers applicable to the Medicare 
Shared Savings Program.165 These waivers are self-executing, broad in 
their applicability, and provide specific protection for ACO pre-
participation activity,166 participation in approved ACOs,167 
distribution of shared savings payments,168 compliance with the Stark 
 
165. 76 Fed. Reg. 67,992, 67,993 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 
ch. IV–V). 
166. Id. at 68,000. The ACO Pre-participation Waiver waives applicability of 
the anti-kickback statute, the Stark law, and the CMP statute for ACO 
activity that pre-dates the effective date of the ACO participation 
agreement, so long as certain requirements are met. Parties must make 
a good faith attempt to develop an ACO that will participate in the 
Shared Savings Program, as evidenced by contemporaneous 
documentation of diligent steps to create a governance structure, 
leadership, and management. A description of the arrangement must be 
publicly disclosed. The Pre-participation Waiver protects start-up 
activity that would otherwise violate the three fraud-and-abuse 
provisions for the one-year period preceding the application’s due date 
with the Secretary. Id.  
167. Id. at 68,000–01. The ACO Participation Waiver waives the three fraud-
and-abuse provisions for all ACO activities related to an ACO’s 
participants or any combination of its providers and suppliers, if certain 
requirements are met. The ACO must have entered into a participation 
agreement and remained in good standing; the ACO meets governance, 
leadership, and management requirements; the ACO’s governing body 
has made a bona fide determination that the arrangement is reasonably 
related to the Shared Savings Program purposes; and all such 
determinations are contemporaneously documented and made available 
to the Secretary for a period of ten years following completion of the 
arrangement. The waiver becomes effective on the start date of the 
participation agreement and ends six months following the expiration of 
the agreement. If CMS terminates the agreement, however, the waiver 
period will end on the date of termination notice. Id.  
168. Id. at 68,001. The Shared Savings Distribution Waiver applies to all 
three fraud-and-abuse provisions, if all of the conditions are met. The 
ACO must be in good standing with a participation agreement; shared 
savings must be earned by the ACO pursuant to the Shared Savings 
Program; and shared savings must be earned by the ACO during the 
term of the participation agreement, even if distribution occurs after the 
agreement expires. Distributions must be paid to providers/suppliers or 
participants who were a part of the ACO during the year in which 
shared savings were earned, or distributions must be used for activities 
that are reasonably related to the purpose of the Shared Savings 
Program. Id. Additionally, with regard to the CMP statute, the waiver 
applies to payments made directly or indirectly from hospital to 
physician but not knowingly to induce the physician to “reduce or limit 
medically necessary items or services to patients under the direct care of 
the physician.” Id.  
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law,169 and protection for patient incentive payments.170 The ACA also 
permits the Secretary to waive application of the fraud-and-abuse 
provisions to pilot programs on payment bundling, which would 
include the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative;171 
however, CMS has not yet issued comprehensive language on what 
these waivers will require.  
While the scope of the waivers provided under the Shared Savings 
Program is significant and may provide a measure of relief to 
providers who were previously unwilling to take risks by structuring 
value-based arrangements under the existing regulations, the evidence 
shows that many more questions exist regarding long-term reliance on 
these waivers. This Note argues that the reliance on regulatory 
waivers functions as the government’s admission that the current 
regulatory structure is at odds with the ACA’s focus on delivering 
high-value health care through ACOs. Though this is an important 
realization for the government, there are consequences to proceeding 
in a manner where CMS limits the use of waivers to providers 
participating in approved demonstration projects during only the 
period of participation. Without changes to the applicability and use 
of waivers, CMS will chill the adoption of these payment reforms by 
creating uncertainty about providers’ long-term protection under the 
waivers and by creating two tiers of health care innovation.  
One of the primary concerns that providers have under the ACO 
waiver program is the time-limited nature of the protection afforded 
to the financial relationships created as part of an ACO. The 
American Hospital Association (AHA) has expressed concern about 
potential future changes to the IFC without having the opportunity 
 
169. Id. The Compliance with the Physician Self-Referral (Stark) Law 
Waiver waives application of the anti-kickback and CMP provisions to 
any financial relationship between an ACO and its participants or 
providers/suppliers that implicates the Stark law. The waiver requires a 
participation agreement in good standing, a financial relationship that is 
reasonably related to the purpose of the Shared Savings Program, and a 
financial relationship that fully complies with an existing Stark 
exception. Id.  
170. Id. The Waiver for Patient Incentives protects ACOs who provide 
services to participants or its providers/suppliers that are free or below 
fair market value, if all requirements are met. The ACO must have a 
participation agreement in good standing; there must be a reasonable 
connection between the items or services and the care of the beneficiary; 
the services must be in-kind; the items or services are preventive care 
items, or they advance a clinical goal of adherence to a treatment 
regime, drug regime, follow up care plan, or management of a chronic 
disease. Id.  
171. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§ 3023(d), 124 Stat. 119, 403 (2010) (provision codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395cc-4(d) (2012)).  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
Walking a Tightrope 
1410 
to comment further.172 Perhaps more concerning is the potential for 
CMS to modify the terms of the ACO waivers after the initial 
participation agreement between the provider and CMS expires. 
Under this scenario, the AHA fears that waiver protections could be 
subsequently altered or removed altogether, thus exposing providers 
to additional unexpected requirements at a minimum, and potential 
legal risks if CMS or the OIG choose to enforce existing regulations 
without regard for the provider’s adherence to the previous waiver 
requirements.173 
The GAO’s research on provider behavior validates the AHA’s 
concerns regarding industry hesitance to structure financial 
relationships under the protections afforded by the waiver program. A 
recent report cites the time-limited nature of the protection as a 
major impediment to the broad-based formation of new integrated 
relationships.174 Providers have instead chosen to rely on the 
“constraints of existing exceptions and safe harbors” and the advisory 
opinion process.175 As a result of the continuing reluctance to seek an 
advisory opinion because of the time, cost, and uncertainty involved, 
providers are “more likely to implement only those programs that 
mirror already approved programs or none at all.”176 As noted above, 
the narrowness of the previously approved programs limits the scope 
that new programs can take.177 
The AHA has taken issue with another aspect of the ACO 
waivers related to the narrowness of their application and the 
potential effects that such exclusive application could have on the 
development of other “clinically integrated organizations.”178 The 
letter expresses a desire to provide all health programs the same 
opportunity to participate in care coordination improvements, so that 
all patients “have the same opportunity to benefit from quality and 
 
172. Letter from Rick Pollack, Exec. Vice President, Am. Hosp. Assoc., to 
Marilyn Tavenner, Acting Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 
& Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs. Office of Inspector Gen. 1–2 (Jan. 3, 2012) [hereinafter AHA 
Letter], available at http://www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/letter/2012/ 
120103-cl-cms-1439-ifc.pdf. 
173. Id. at 4.  
174. GAO Financial Incentive Report, supra note 133, at 36–37.  
175. Id. at 36. 
176. Id. at 37. The GAO found that the average cost for obtaining an 
advisory opinion ranges from $15,000 to $50,000, can take over a year to 
get a final determination, and requires an actual or contemplated 
business arrangement that is more than a mere hypothetical. Id. at 30–
31.  
177. See discussion supra Part III.C.  
178. AHA Letter, supra note 172, at 1.  
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care coordination.”179 In addition to the above finding indicating that 
providers are hesitating to rely on time-limited waivers, the GAO 
noted that not all health systems are eligible for or even willing to 
participate in federal demonstration projects for which they could 
receive a waiver.180 For providers opting to experiment with financial 
incentive arrangements with private payers outside of the Medicare 
Shared Savings Program, the GAO cited significant risks and 
complications with structuring such arrangements because of the 
inevitable spillover into the Medicare patient population.181 Thus, 
while providers seek to operate private value-based payment 
arrangements within the existing Stark, anti-kickback, and CMP 
framework, the potential for liability in areas previously discussed still 
remains, with no protection offered by the fraud-and-abuse waivers.182 
It is now clear that the American health care system is at a 
crossroads. The government’s decision, as embodied in the ACA, to 
move toward value-based payment for health services is likely to 
continue at a growing pace in the coming years.183 While the 
government deserves credit for moving away from the costly and 
ineffective fee-for-service reimbursement model, serious conflicts with 
the underlying regulatory framework remain and must be addressed. 
Regulatory waivers are a clear recognition of the current regulatory 
framework’s incompatibility with value-based payment design, but 
 
179. Id.  
180. GAO Financial Incentive Report, supra note 133, at 37.  
181. See id. at 22 (noting that legal experts found it “difficult to separate 
commercial patients from Medicare patients for the purposes of financial 
incentive programs” and that programs “limited to commercial patient 
populations may ‘spill over’ to Medicare patients”). Providers 
implementing ACO-type arrangements with private payers rely on the 
existing safe-harbor and exception framework, often using the 
employment exception to protect from inadvertent inclusion of Medicare 
patients in the shared savings program. Id. The number of health care 
providers who are able to take advantage of this protection through 
direct physician employment is, however, comparatively limited. In such 
instances, providers must rely on other ill-suited safe harbors and 
exceptions, such as the requirements for personal services arrangements 
and management contracts. See discussion supra Part III.A–B.  
182. See discussion supra notes 166–170 (noting that protection by each of 
the fraud-and-abuse waivers is limited to providers who have a Medicare 
Shared Savings Program participation agreement on file or under review 
by CMS).  
183. An article written by leading health policy experts recommends 
converting at least seventy-five percent of payments in every region to 
fee-for-service alternatives within the next ten years. Emanuel et al., 
supra note 127, at 950. This will inevitably include payments under the 
shared savings and bundled payment models that conflict with the 
existing regulatory limitations. 
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the waivers do not present the comprehensive, long-term solution that 
is required to speed the adoption of innovative payment 
methodologies both within and outside the Medicare program. Part V 
begins by exploring some of the immediate changes that CMS should 
consider under its existing waiver authority. It then moves to a 
discussion on the long-term regulatory options that legislators and 
policymakers should consider as value-based payment models become 
the new normal. 
V. A New Approach to Regulating Health Care in 
the Value-Based Payment Era 
Regulatory waivers may provide a temporary means to achieving 
the desired end of paying for value, but the government’s reliance on 
waivers should be simply that—temporary. The discriminatory effect 
that the current waivers have on providers who do not qualify for or 
choose not to participate in CMS-sanctioned demonstration projects is 
counterproductive to the goal of achieving broad participation in 
value-based payment models. CMS’s ability to waive fraud-and-abuse 
provisions in order to achieve the integrated payment and referral 
relationships functions as a recognition that the existing regulations 
inhibit the necessary formation of those relationships and no longer 
reflect the priorities of preventing fraud and abuse in the modern era. 
While it is unlikely that a wholesale elimination of these 
regulations is likely anytime in the near future, CMS must explore 
long-term alternatives that can provide certainty in how health care 
organizations can structure future financial and care delivery 
relationships. Future regulations should build on the approach taken 
in the Shared Savings Program and focus on preventing fraud and 
abuse through accountability and transparency using the expanded 
capabilities of health information technology.  
A. Interim Reforms for Immediate Consideration 
The GAO has noted that CMS’s authority to issue waivers under 
provisions of the ACA is broader than its authority to promulgate 
new exceptions under the Stark law.184 In order to create an exception 
to Stark, the proposed arrangement must present “no risk” of 
“program or patient abuse.”185 As CMS concluded in 2008 with the 
proposed gainsharing exception, the “no risk” standard for new Stark 
exceptions in an era of experimentation and uncertainty often 
prevents large-scale changes from taking place.186 Realizing that 
 
184. GAO Financial Incentive Report, supra note 133, at 18.  
185. Id. 
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exceptions and safe harbors for the underlying regulatory framework 
are unlikely in this period of transition from fee for service to 
payment for value, CMS should instead focus on correcting the 
shortfalls with the current waiver process.  
First, CMS should provide more certainty to providers 
participating in alternative payment models covered by fraud-and-
abuse waiver authority by extending the waivers’ coverage 
indefinitely, so long as providers continue to meet obligations specified 
in the participation agreement and the objectives set by CMS at the 
outset of the program. This was the position taken by the hospital 
industry187 in response to CMS’s promulgation of the IFC in 
November 2011;188 however, CMS has not released any updated waiver 
language in response to these concerns.  
Second, CMS should expand the coverage of waivers to other 
alternative payment programs and provide immediate guidance to 
providers through rulemaking. As of March 2013, CMS has not 
promulgated waiver language through rulemaking with respect to 
other demonstration programs that could potentially run afoul of the 
fraud-and-abuse regulations currently in force.189 Providing guidance 
to organizational leaders contemplating participation in these 
innovative care delivery programs could minimize uncertainty without 
undue risk to the Medicare program. As part of the waiver language 
promulgated by CMS, the agency should provide guidance to 
providers who treat Medicare patients and are participating in value-
based payment arrangements not sanctioned by CMS. As noted in 
Part IV, the risk that nonparticipating providers will run afoul of the 
Medicare fraud-and-abuse regulations while participating in private 
ACO-type arrangements has chilled the formation of innovative 
relationships across a large swath of organizations that may not be  
186. See id. at 18–19 (noting that the “no risk” requirement for new Stark 
exceptions presented a “challenge in providing broad flexibility for 
innovative, effective programs while at the same time protecting the 
Medicare program and patients from abuses”).  
187. See AHA Letter, supra note 172, at 2, 4 (noting that the Shared Savings 
Program waivers should be finalized in their current form and that 
changing the rules for organizations that seek to renew their contracts 
after meeting performance standards could undermine innovation and 
the development of new delivery models).  
188. 76 Fed. Reg. 67,992 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. ch. IV–
V).  
189. With respect to the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative, 
CMS has indicated that the Secretary may choose to exercise waiver 
authority provided in the ACA and that such waivers would be included 
in individual agreements with CMS. See Bundled Payment FAQs, 
supra note 122, at 8–9. Broadly applicable and self-executing waivers 
similar to those in the Shared Savings Program promulgated through 
rulemaking, however, have not been published.  
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participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program and subject to 
the expansive waivers it provides.  
Third, after extending the scope of coverage under the waivers as 
recommended above, CMS should finalize the IFC and protect 
providers’ reliance by indicating that future changes will proceed 
through notice and comment rulemaking and that changes will not 
retroactively apply to participation agreements already in effect. CMS 
should, however, retain the authority to modify the waiver with 
respect to individual entities if objectives of the Shared Savings 
Program are not met, or if fraud-and-abuse concerns necessitate 
modification or termination of the organization’s participation 
agreement. Upon the expiration of participation agreements after the 
initial three-year ACO term, CMS should refrain from imposing 
changes on participating providers who were operating under the 
initial waiver language, unless individual circumstances require 
changes in the participation agreement to protect program integrity. 
As the AHA noted, seeking to impose changes on ACOs who have 
successfully achieved CMS’s objectives could undermine the efforts 
providers have made to structure incentives and provider 
relationships.190  
These recommendations are, of course, only a temporary solution 
that will bridge the gap between a health care system moving toward 
value-based payments and a regulatory structure tailored to an 
antiquated fee-for-service model. As paying for value continues to gain 
traction, the government must recalibrate its approach to regulating 
fraud and abuse.  
B. Ideas for Long-Term Regulatory Reform  
As policy experts and government regulators contemplate future 
fraud and abuse protections, special consideration should be given to 
the effectiveness of the safeguards put in place during the initial phase 
of the Shared Savings Program. As part of their agreements with 
CMS, entities participating in the demonstration projects must agree 
to stringent reporting and compliance requirements that exceed the 
requirements placed on nonparticipating providers, likely as a result 
of the relaxed application of the fraud-and-abuse provisions. If this 
alternative to the existing regulatory framework is successful, 
Congress should consider, and CMS should provide guidance on, ways 
in which this alternative form of regulation could be expanded to all 
providers once value-based payments become the predominant form of 
health care reimbursement.  
In order to maintain a participation agreement in good standing 
with CMS and benefit from the broadly worded regulatory waivers, 
providers must agree to expansive new quality reporting, 
 
190. AHA Letter, supra note 172, at 4.  
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accountability, and transparency requirements.191 First, ACOs must 
establish or designate a legal structure with a governing body that 
can ensure management accountability and transparent compliance 
with quality performance standards.192 Second, the ACO must develop 
patient centered processes using evidence-based medicine and 
beneficiary engagement and integrate those processes into the 
organization’s health care teams.193 Third, the ACO must furnish data 
demonstrating adherence to quality of care metrics established by 
CMS, subject to a medical record audit and data validation.194 
Fourth, CMS is permitted to employ a range of methods to “monitor 
and assess the performance of ACOs,” including analysis of quality 
measurement data and beneficiary and provider complaints, coding 
audits, and electronic health record reviews.195 Fifth, each ACO must 
publicly report information disclosing all joint venture agreements and 
members of the governing body, all shared savings and loss 
information, and aggregate data related to patient experiences and 
quality of care.196 While ACOs are subject to many additional 
requirements, these major provisions are most instructive for 
discussing what policymakers should consider when formulating future 
fraud-and-abuse regulations. 
The government’s reliance on this form of regulation could be an 
important first step in moving away from the structural framework 
characterized by generally applicable safe harbors and exceptions to 
direct regulation of providers through contractual agreements 
requiring transparent and accountable care.197 As increasing numbers 
 
191. See GAO Financial Incentive Report, supra note 133, at 33 (noting 
that an ACO’s “continued participation in the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program is contingent on its performance” and CMS may “terminate an 
ACO’s participation in the program based on the agency’s findings”).  
192. 42 C.F.R. §§ 425.104–425.106 (2012).  
193. 42 C.F.R. § 425.112 (2012).  
194. 42 C.F.R. § 425.500 (2012).  
195. 42 C.F.R. § 425.316(a)(2) (2012). When read in conjunction with 42 
C.F.R. § 425.506, where CMS strongly encourages providers to adopt 
electronic health record systems, the review of patient health records 
will require reviewing them in their electronic form. See 42 C.F.R. § 
425.506 (noting that ACOs are “encouraged to develop a robust EHR 
infrastructure” and that “[p]erformance on [the quality measures 
regarding EHR adoption] will be weighted twice that of any other 
measure for scoring purposes and for determining compliance with 
quality performance requirements”).  
196. 42 C.F.R. § 425.308 (2012).  
197. This is an approach for which Professor Kristin Madison of the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School advocates. See Madison, supra 
note 42, at 422. Madison favors an approach that is less reliant on 
indirect structural regulation that attempts to micromanage the referral 
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of providers become “meaningful users” of electronic health record 
(EHR) technology, the prospect of adopting a framework of fraud-
and-abuse regulation that relies on strict data reporting requirements 
becomes even more likely. Indeed, one of the provisions of the 
meaningful use regulations, which all providers must meet in order to 
qualify for federal financial assistance for EHR adoption under the 
HITECH Act,198 is for providers to monitor a growing set of clinical 
quality measures (CQMs).199 By expanding the quality reporting 
requirements under the meaningful use regulations and strongly 
encouraging the use of electronic health records going forward,200 the 
government can engage in a new form of fraud-and-abuse regulation 
that promotes the creation of integrated provider relationships yet 
still protects the Medicare program from fraud and abuse.  
It is difficult to predict what role the anti-kickback statute, the 
Stark law, and the CMP statute will play in a health care system that 
relies on waivers from their expansive prohibitions in order to deliver 
coordinated and value-driven health care. Though it is difficult to 
predict the fate of these particular statutes, it is not impossible to 
glean some insight into how the government envisions the future of 
fraud-and-abuse regulation. In a recent article, Daniel Levinson, the 
Inspector General for HHS, hinted that certain provisions of these 
statutes might still be applicable for providers who violate the terms 
of the Shared Savings Program participation agreement and the 
associated waivers. Levinson mentioned that the government 
“retained authorities to redress identified problems,” that the 
“integrity requirements embedded into the SSP and the waivers 
would mitigate the risk of harm in the first instance, and that residual 
 
relationships and compensation arrangements between providers. 
Instead, she favors expanding the use of information technology, 
especially electronic health record systems, to better discern the quality 
of care received by patients and tailoring payments to the value received 
by patients, as dictated by objective quality metrics. Id.  
198. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
(HITECH) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  
199. For fiscal year 2014, hospitals must begin to monitor twenty-four 
clinical quality metrics related to patient engagement, patient safety, 
care coordination, population and public health, efficient use of health 
care resources, and clinical processes and effectiveness using the 
electronic health record system. See Electronic Health Record Incentive 
Program Stage II, 77 Fed. Reg. 13,698, 13,759 (proposed Mar. 7, 2012) 
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 412, 413, 495). 
200. The HITECH Act mandates Medicare payment adjustments take effect 
in 2015 if providers have not become meaningful users of electronic 
health records, with exceptions for a narrow set of circumstances. See 
id. at 13,700–01 (describing payment adjustments and exceptions).  
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risk could be remediated through appropriate government action.”201 
For those who violate their contractual obligations, Levinson notes 
that the government may take action using “enforcement authorities 
that were not waived” and other “administrative tools”202 to address 
“harms associated with kickbacks and referral payments, including 
overutilization, increased costs, and substandard or poor quality 
care.”203 Levinson’s comments indicate that the government may 
intend to rely on the safeguards in the participation agreements and 
waivers as a long-term policy solution. The statutes from which 
providers receive a waiver would seemingly remain in effect and, in 
conjunction with other non-waived provisions, namely the False 
Claims Act, function as a punitive backstop that applies once 
providers violate their participation agreement or the waiver 
requirements.  
Parsing the words of government regulators may provide some 
indication of the future of the underlying statutes that comprise the 
fee-for-service regulatory framework, but little is known with 
certainty. Recent statements by the Inspector General indicate that 
the statutes will remain in place with undefined enforcement 
applicability. The extent to which the anti-kickback, Stark, and CMP 
statutes would serve a valuable purpose when other regulatory 
provisions, namely the False Claims Act, are capable of protecting 
against overutilization, increased costs, and substandard or poor 
quality care will certainly be debated in the future. What cannot be 
disputed now, however, is that waiving the applicability of these 
statutes more broadly in the short term is a necessary step during this 
period of transition. But, as the delivery model continues to shift 
toward integrated systems capable of delivering efficient, high quality 
care in the future, waivers will prove to be an increasingly inadequate 
and unreliable long-term policy solution. So, in contemplating post-
fee-for-service fraud-and-abuse regulation, policymakers must 
recalibrate their approach by implementing a framework that reflects 
the incentives created by a value-based payment system and 
capitalizes on the new functionality of EHR data repositories.  
Conclusion 
The American health care system is undergoing rapid change that 
involves a shift from fee-for-service payment to value-based payment 
that depends heavily on care coordination and provider integration. 
Underlying this shift in payment methodologies is a regulatory 
 
201. Daniel R. Levinson, A New Era of Medicare Oversight, 15 J. Health 
Care L. & Pol’y 249, 261 (2012).  
202. Id.  
203. Id. at 261 n.57 (quoting Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared 
Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,992, 68,008 (2011)).  
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structure that was originally designed to tackle fraud-and-abuse 
schemes arising out of the fee-for-service payment system. The way 
Medicare pays for services is undergoing significant change, yet the 
fraud-and-abuse regulations inhibit developing integrated provider 
arrangements as part of value-based payment programs. Legislators 
provided some flexibility in the form of regulatory waivers that will 
allow for short-term experimentation and transition; however, the 
approach has several deficiencies that should be addressed in the near 
term. Going forward, the regulation of fraud and abuse in a health 
care system that is encouraging the development of larger, highly 
integrated care delivery systems must keep pace. A new regulatory 
framework must consider the changed incentives that have resulted 
from value-based payments and capitalize on the new capabilities that 
EHR systems offer in delivering high quality care.  
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